STATES OF JERSEY
Committee of Inquiry: Toxic Incinerator Ash Dumping in the St. Helier Waterfront Land Reclamation Schemes
Lodged au Greffe on 10th June 2008
by Senator S. Syvret
STATES GREFFE
PROPOSITION
THE STATES
are asked to decide whether they are of opinion -
to
establish a Committee of Inquiry in accordance with Standing Order 146 in order
to examine all matters relating to the handling and dumping of toxic ash from
the Island’s municipal waste incinerator into the marine land reclamation sites
and other areas; and, specifically –
(a) to examine the breakdown in public
administration which enabled the irresponsible and unsafe dumping of the toxic
ash and to examine why this was able to occur and to consider what improvements
and safeguards should be introduced in order to ensure that public
administration is subject to effective checks and balances;
(b) to consider what, if any, additional
monitoring and precautions should be introduced to safeguard human health from
the toxins within the reclamation sites;
(c) to consider what, if any, additional
measures should be taken to protect the marine environment from the toxins
within the reclamation sites;
(d) to consider whether States departments
placed Jersey – and by extension the United Kingdom – in a position
in which it has breached its obligations under the OSPAR Convention as a result
of the dumping;
(e) to examine and report on any related
matters which the Committee considers relevant to its inquiry.
SENATOR S. SYVRET
REPORT
It is plain on the evidence, as described in this
report alone, that the health and welfare of the people of Jersey, the Island’s
environment and the marine environment which we share with our neighbours, have
been needlessly put at risk because of a systemic and cultural failure of
public administration in the Island.
A complete breakdown in effective checks and balances
within the Island’s public administration has occurred.
The evidenced facts being clear – the States of
Jersey must finally face the truth and learn the necessary lessons.
The land reclamation sites which surround
St. Helier’s harbour area are toxic waste dumps.
Moreover – they are toxic waste dumps which have
needlessly exposed the public to potential human health risks.
Moreover – the land reclamation sites are toxic
waste dumps which are sea-porous and subjected to the vast hydro-pneumatic
forces generated by Jersey’s 13 metre tides.
Therefore St. Helier’s land reclamation sites
represent a massive source of potentially hazardous leachate into the sea.
How on Earth was this able to happen?
The States finally needs to recognise that the ash
dumping – whilst a problem of itself – was really a symptom of a
greater problem, namely, an apparent intrinsic inability of the Island’s government
to subject itself to meaningful and effective regulation.
Longer-serving members of the States and members of
the public may recall that for many of the early years of the
controversy – when people first started to object to the ash
dumping – it was frequently claimed that there was no problem, that the
ash did not represent a threat to human health, that it was “inert”, that it
posed no risk to the environment and that it was not toxic. Sometimes one still
hears claims to that effect. Let there be no mistake about this: the ash is
toxic; it always has been; even setting aside components of the ash such as
dioxins, furans and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), which only really became
understood by science in the last half-century, many of the toxic heavy metals
that are components of the ash have long been known to badly damage human
health. In some cases this knowledge has existed for well-over a century.
Even now the incinerator and the handling and disposal
of the resultant ash fail to meet acceptable standards. However, some
improvements in the handling and disposal of the ash took place from the
mid-1990s – after years of campaigning in the face of official denials.
This leaves a period of time from the opening of the incinerator in the late
1970s to the mid 1990s when the behaviour of the Island’s public authorities
can only be described as utterly irresponsible and cavalier.
The question that therefore arises is this –
How is it that the entire panoply of
public administration in Jersey – some parts of which have specific duties
to protect human health and the environment – can have failed to take
proper steps to protect people and the environment from the toxic ash over a
period of at least 15 years?
I know the answer to this question and it is a
question that goes to the very heart of whether Jersey is, in fact,
structurally and culturally capable of governing itself in a manner compatible
with the health and welfare of its people? This proposition and inquiry is the
test.
Why is an
inquiry necessary?
To gain an expertly informed assessment of the ash
dumping, its history, the deficiencies – be they organisational or
cultural – of public administration which allowed this toxin-dumping to
continue unchecked for so long, the long-term issues arising from the heavy
pollution of the sites and to produce a detailed report and set of
recommendations – for protecting human health, the management of the
pollution in the sites, and of improvements to public administration so as to
safeguard against similar failings in the future.
Why a
Committee of Inquiry?
Having taken a long-term interest in this subject I
know from personal experience that – sadly – a great number of
straightforward lies have been told to politicians by certain civil servants.
Therefore only a quasi-judicial process such as a Committee of Inquiry will be
able to compel attendance of witnesses and examine them under oath – any
untruths being spoken then being perjury. The States of Jersey (Powers,
Privileges and Immunities) (Committees of Inquiry) (Jersey) Regulations 2007
contain a wide range of powers to enable the Committee to operate effectively
and also make it clear in Regulation 8(3) that the immunity from civil or
criminal proceedings given to a witness does not apply “to evidence given or documents produced by that person which he or she
knows to be untrue”.
It is the case that Committees of Inquiry can, by law,
regulate their own proceedings. The relevant passage from standing orders is
this –
“147 Committee of inquiry: proceedings
(1) A committee of inquiry may regulate its own procedure for the conduct and management of its proceedings including, but not limited to, venue and adjournments.
(2) Proceedings before a committee of inquiry shall be held in public unless the committee, in the interests of justice or the public interest, decides that all or any part of the proceedings shall be in private.”
The powers of a Committee of Inquiry are described in
detail in the States of Jersey (Powers, Privileges and Immunities) (Committees
of Inquiry) (Jersey) Regulations 2007. In respect of taking evidence under
oath, Regulation 6 says –
(1) A committee of inquiry may require a person appearing before it to give evidence on oath.
(2) The chairman of a committee of inquiry is authorized to administer the oath for this purpose.”
Whilst it is accepted that the Committee of Inquiry
will make its own decisions in respect of the procedure it chooses to follow,
this proposition is brought forward in the hope that the proceedings will be
held in public unless it is absolutely necessary to here any evidence in
camera.
It is also my view that the Committee of Inquiry will
not be able to access the truth unless it takes evidence under oath – with
the resultant risk of perjury should any witness knowingly state falsehoods to
the Committee.
The
Evidential Background
Jersey’s municipal waste incinerator commenced
operation in 1979. It is also worth noting in passing that the incinerator
itself produces such high degrees of toxicity and pollution from its chimney
that it has been illegal to operate any such plant in the European Union for
over a decade. Were Jersey a full-member of the EU – the incinerator
would, by law, have been closed down.
Returning to the casual dumping of the combined ash
into Jersey’s land reclamation sites, this practice continued from 1979 until
approximately 1995 – when, finally, after many years of campaigning –
the authorities were compelled to adopt a safer and more responsible disposal
methodology.
In the early 1990s, Jersey’s Public Services
Department, in response to concerns, commissioned Warren Spring Laboratory to
undertake an analysis of emissions from the incinerator. Included was a
detailed analysis of the ash produced by the incinerator. The table I reproduce
below is to be found on page 29 of the WSL report –
Table 1
TABLE 9 –CONCENTRATIONS OF METALS IN COMBINED
RESIDUAL ASH
|
METAL |
UNIT 2 |
UNIT 3 |
|
|
µg g |
µg g |
|
Mercury |
0.46 |
0.29 |
|
Vanadium |
62.3 |
56.1 |
|
Chromium |
212 |
244 |
|
Manganese |
937 |
937 |
|
Cobalt |
21.2 |
17.7 |
|
Nickel |
60.3 |
74.9 |
|
Copper |
18110 |
1160 |
|
Zinc |
6200 |
4540 |
|
Arsenic |
54.2 |
34.4 |
|
Selenium |
1.41 |
0.53 |
|
Cadmium |
33.5 |
34.0 |
|
Tin |
274 |
272 |
|
Antimony |
177 |
83.8 |
|
Thallium |
0.45 |
0.33 |
|
Lead |
4170 |
2020 |
Amongst the other information in the report are two tables –
11A and 11B – to be found on pages 30 and 31 of the WSL report. These two
tables describe the ‘CONCENTRATIONS OF
DIOXINS AND DIBENZOFURANS IN COMBINED RESIDUE ASH”, for units 2 and 3
respectively. These showed the total dioxin and dibenzofuran content of the
combined ash from unit 2 to be 6.4112 ng-g, and a concentration of 0.5014 ng-g
for unit 3.
Thus the WSL report demonstrates scientifically that
the combined ash from the incinerator contains a variety of toxic heavy metals
and polychlorinated compounds such as dioxins and furans which are a proven
threat to human health. To further demonstrate this fact I reproduce below a
section of a table titled “Toxic Effects of Common Hazardous Compounds”. This
is from page 476 of “Hazardous Wastes: Sources, Pathways, Receptors” by
Richard J. Watts, published by John Wiley & Sons, ISBN 0-471-00238-0.
Table 2
|
Chemical |
Acute
Effects |
Chronic
Effects |
|
Polychlorinated
Biphenyls PCB’s |
Minimal acute toxicity (0.5 g/Kg to 11.3Kg |
Chloracne; increased liver enzymes; possible
reproductive effects; act as cancer promoters |
|
Dioxins
and Furans PCDDs/PCDFs |
Chloracne, headaches, peripheral neuropathy |
Induction of microsomal enzymes; altered liver
metabolism; altered T-cell sub-sets; immunotoxicity; strongly implicated in
carcinogenicity (may be a promoter) |
|
Inorganic
Compounds Arsenic |
Loss of blood, intestinal injuries, acute
respiratory failure |
Myelogeneous leukaemia, cancer of skin, lungs, lymph
glands, bladder, kidney, prostate and liver |
|
Cadmium |
Vomiting, cramping, weakness, and diarrhoea |
Oral ingestion results in renal necrosis and
dysfunction; induces lung, prostate, kidney, and stomach cancer in animals;
no documented human cancer |
|
Hexavalent chromium |
Readily absorbed by the skin where it acts as an
irritant and immune-system sensitizer; oral absorption results in acute renal
failure |
Lung cancer |
|
Mercury |
Central nervous system impairment including injury
to motor neurons; renal disjunction |
Central nervous system dysfunction, memory deficits,
decrease in psychomotor skills, tremors |
|
Nickel |
Not highly toxic, headache, shortness of breath |
Immune system effects resulting in allergic contact
dermatitis |
It appears that the WSL study did not test for
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) but it is likely that PCB is also present in
the ash given its past use in electrical equipment. Only 5 of the 15 metal
components of the ash identified in the WSL report are described in
Table 2 so one must consider the fact of the existence of additional
hazardous components in the ash to those listed in the table.
Therefore, when considering human exposure to the ash
and potential health impacts, we must acknowledge that we are not
dealing with the possible effects of just one toxin – but a
cocktail of toxins. Depending upon the degree and type of exposure, the
potential health impact could be greater than that predicted for a single
toxin. Moreover, there may be a synergistic effect, that is, an additional
effect greater than that which might be predicted from exposure to the individual
toxins or the toxins combined.
In terms of real-world human health impacts of
exposure to the incinerator ash, it might be hypothesised that we are unlikely
to be dealing with acute effects. It is likely that if any human health impacts
flow from exposure to the ash, it is the chronic effects, rather than the acute
effects that we need to be particularly concerned with. If any chronic effects
have occurred, the most likely cohort of the affected will be site workers
exposed to the combined ash. It should be stated that no manifestation of ill
health effects potentially caused by the ash have yet been detected. It is to
be hoped that none occur, although a detailed epidemiology study would need to
be undertaken over an extended period of time.
However – and this is one of the prime concerns
underpinning this proposition – if no human health impacts have
occurred – it is more by luck than judgment.
The States of Jersey has committed gross errors, and
exhibited a cavalier attitude to the dumping of the ash. These include the
dumping of the combined ash – a proven cocktail of toxins – into a
sea-porous land reclamation site; leaving the dumped ash exposed to the air for
extended periods of time enabling the dried ash to be blown across pedestrian areas
and onto nearby buildings; causing people to become exposed to the ash;
failing, for many years, to protect workers on the sites from close exposure to
the ash over extended periods of time and failing to properly take into account
the long-term future use of the sites once completed.
In its error-strewn and incompetent handling of the
incinerator ash, the States of Jersey has played Russian roulette with the
health of this community and our environment.
It has always been – even as a lay-person –
very easy to establish 3 basic facts –
1: that the incinerator ash was a
cocktail of proven toxic components;
2: that dumping the ash in a manner that
exposed workers, the public and the marine environment to it was not a good
idea;
3: that other dumping methodologies which
could be employed would be an improvement; for example, disposing of the ash in
lined pits or binding the ash in some form of matrix material thus rendering it
into a less environmentally available form.
If a
lay-person could readily establish these facts within days of taking an
interest in the subject, how can it be that every relevant States agency
failed, to a lesser or greater extent, to respond in an adequate and/or timely
manner to issues associated with the ash dumping over a period of at least 15
years?
And what
does this say concerning the quality and safety of public administration in
Jersey?
What risk do these sites pose to the marine
environment in the next 50, 100 or 150 years? And is this our problem?
Dr. Michael Romeril, the Environmental Adviser, in a report of 1992,
quotes a figure of 17, 217 tonnes of combined ash dumped in 1988 alone. As
is well documented, the volume of waste going to incineration, and consequent
ash disposal, has risen steadily over the years. However, let us make a
conservative estimate for the amount of ash dumped from 1988 until 1995 when
dumping practice changed. Take a conservative average of 17,000 tonnes per
year and multiply by 8. This gives a figure of 136,000 tonnes of combined
incinerator ash dumped in the site in a reckless manner – in this
8 year period alone.
But it
should be noted that this figure completely excludes the many tens of thousands
of tonnes of combined ash dumped from when the incinerator first came on-stream
in 1979.
Dr. Romeril goes on to quote the amount of some
of the heavy metals in the 17,217 tonnes for the single year 1988 –
“approximate
total input per year of 440kg cadmium, 4.8kg mercury and 64,000kg lead. Whilst
salts of these metals are not particularly soluble, an aging and mineralization
process may continue for hundreds of years. (Hjelmar, 1987)”
Some important observations –
·
These volumes need to be
multiplied for every year of dumping from 1979 until 1995.
·
These figures deal only
with 3 of the 15 metals identified as components of the ash by the WSL report.
·
These figures do not
deal with the dioxin, furan and PCB content of the ash. These toxins, whilst
not water soluble, could nevertheless be transmitted to the broader environment
through the sea water acting as a vector for ash from the sites. Additionally,
these toxins may be released to the environment every time contaminated areas
of the waterfront are excavated.
However, the “official” view of the relevant States
departments of the risks these contaminants pose was remarkable for the simple
incompetence and dishonesty which was routinely displayed.
Indeed so lax and incompetent were the Public Services
Department, that it took until the mid-1990s for it to produce a report that
considered future strategies for dumping the ash – and even then the
report only came about as a result of sustained political pressure. This leaves
us considering a period of nearly 2 decades of cavalier irresponsibility
and intransigence on the part of the Island’s waste disposal authorities.
To say that the report itself, ‘Incinerator Plant Ash
Disposal – Strategies for the Future’, was riddled with inadequacies would
be an understatement. In the early 1990s, oyster farmer and marine biologist,
Mr. Tony Legg, took a detailed interest in the ash dumping and
related issues. He produced a number of papers which he supplied to the
authorities and interested politicians, myself included.
In a commentary on the PSD report referred to above,
dated February 1995, Mr. Legg makes the following observation –
“The
document contains numerous technical errors, misinterpretations and, it would
appear, deliberate attempts to confuse and mislead lay politicians. If this is
a document to lay to rest the “criticisms originating from sources with little
knowledge or experience of the complex issues involved” then it falls well
short of the mark and exposes instead the Department’s poor grasp of wider
issues. It also exposes the Department as wishing to avoid, rather than comply,
when their position as enforcer/competent authority should be beyond reproach.”
Speaking as someone who witnessed the performance of
the Public Services Department at first hand, as a member of the Committee from
the end of 1990 until 1993 until I resigned over this issue, I can only agree
entirely with Mr. Legg’s assessment of the performance and motivations of
the Department.
In a paper written in respect of the then proposed
dumping of ash in the south of La Collette site, Mr. Legg considered
the potential for Cadmium to leach –
“From
the above observations it is evident that an oxidising environment that is high
in chlorine, that fluctuates in salinity, that occasionally is anoxic with free
sulphide ions, that has a water table comprised of tidal and field water
capacity interstitial solute, and has energy put into the system by tidal
movement of that solute, is very well suited to making cadmium bioavailable. In
addition, the ash material is already in an oxidised state, thereby speeding up
the process.
“In
situ, the ash is likely to be just above the MHWS mark and some 2 meters
deep with c. 1 meter overburden. After normal rainfall or windblown spray
this zone will be at field capacity with water filling all available pore
spaces. When the tide rises or falls this water will be moved and exchanged,
salinities will change, waters will drain and cadmium enriched leachate will
form.”
Although written in respect of proposals to dump ash
in a layer above MHWS across the La Collette 2 site, these
observations could apply to the West of Albert site where ash was dumped
extensively in a layer across much of the land reclamation scheme. The
processes described could be occurring now or begin to occur in the future. A
further factor that must be of grave concern is the potential for tidal forces
to extract material from the sites. This is problematic for several reasons,
not least that such erosion would cause the toxic ash to be taken into the
marine environment in substantial quantities. There is a risk of significant
quantities of infill material being removed from the reclamation sites through
the action of the sea. Mr. Legg also highlighted this danger in a
paper –
“Hydropneumatic
Erosion: This process warrants most consideration. It is the process that leads
to ‘Blow Hole’ formation on exposed cliff faces. Where wave action is severe,
voids are formed within the eroded face. Subsequent wave action then compresses
air within the void which can then expand explosively. Of interest is that this
process can continue many tens of meters from the point of wave action and many
meters above the high tide mark. (St. Catherine’s Breakwater had a void
26 meters deep caused by this process, 25 km fetch). It may be that
no area within the new reclamation is risk free from this process, including
high level profiles.”
POSSIBLE
HEALTH IMPACTS
In 2001 the Health and Social Services Committee,
under my Presidency, requested its officers to prepare a report which examined
the health implications of the contaminated reclamation sites. The then Medical
Officer of Health, Dr. John Harvey, and Health Protection Officer, Steve
Smith, co-authored a report titled: ‘Health Impact of the West of Albert Pier
Reclamation Site.’ I quote from that report here –
“Recent
published studies have recognised the possible cumulative and synergistic
effect of multiple hazardous agents, and have looked at the effect of exposure
to hazardous sites, not individual toxins. The exposure risk is residence near
to contaminated sites.
“The
risk of adverse birth outcomes has been the focus of two such studies. A study
of all residence near landfill sites in Great Britain showed small excess risks
(c.10-20%) of some congenital anomalies and low birth weight. This was not
greater near sites with special waste (i.e. known toxic waste such as
incinerator ash) possibly because these sites were subject to strict
regulation. The authors noted that the small excess could be due to residual
confounding (unmeasured effect of deprivation) or data artefacts. Another
Europe wide study showed higher levels of risk for congenital anomalies. This
study, known as EUROHAZCON used data from 7 registers in 5 countries.
It showed an increased risk (2 – 3 times higher) for mothers
living within 3km of landfill sites.
“A
study in Canada showed increased risks of certain cancers for men living near
solid waste landfill sites. The increases of twice the risk were shown for
cancer of the pancreas in men living within 1.25km, cancer of the liver for
those living within 1.5km, and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma within 2km.”
As far as I am aware, this work by Dr. John
Harvey and Steve Smith, represents the very first time frank and professional
information concerning possible health impacts arising from the ash dumps, was
put before any States committee – this after 23 years of incinerator
operation. One can only wonder what else the public and the Island’s
politicians are not told?
The observations of Dr. Harvey and Mr. Smith
quoted above show that a link between waste dumps and ill-health has been
demonstrated epidemiologically. It also illustrates the fact that medical
science is a constantly evolving field of work. It is feasible that in the not
distant future, medical science may concluded that multi-toxin compounds, such
as the incinerator ash, represent a greater threat to human health than is
recognised today. It should be noted that the toxicity of substances is rarely
down-graded.
More usually, as scientific knowledge advances,
substances are demonstrated to be more toxic than previously thought. Even the
scientific orthodoxy of the day can prove to have been wrong. Organophosphate
pesticides and asbestos were at one time not regarded as posing a particular
health risk. Likewise BSE was thought to be not transmittable to people and
thus did not represent a human health risk. The prevalent scientific orthodoxy
of the day was wrong.
However –
it must be recognised that when considering the incinerator ash we are not
dealing with speculative toxicity. As
shown above, many of the components of the ash are proven, known toxins.
The long-term failure of the Environmental Health
Department (now known as the Health Protection Department) has to be regarded
with the utmost seriousness. There is simply no hiding place from this fact.
Until the arrival in the department of Dr. John Harvey and Steve Smith,
the Environmental Health Department, preceding MOHs and Health and Safety at
Work failed in their duty to intervene and seek to protect the public from a
health risk posed by the mass dumping of an unambiguously toxic material. How
could this have happened and what needs to be done to ensure that no similar
failure occurs again?
For example, questions need to be asked of
Dr. Richard Grainger, a former Medical Officer of Health, concerning his
failure to act appropriately in this matter.
In a letter to me, dated 15th August 1995,
Environmental Adviser, Dr. Michael Romeril, enclosed a letter he had
received from Dr. Grainger, dated 11th July 1995. In this letter
Dr. Grainger said –
“I
have liaised with Tony Bruce, who has taken over from Tony Littlewood as Chief
Environmental Health Officer, and can confirm that we will be involved as and
when necessary on this issue. Certainly, investigations that we have taken up
to now, do not show this to be a major health issue, although obviously a
highly emotive political problem.”
Dr. Grainger’s intransigent attitude to the
subject is further demonstrated in the fact that the Public Services Department
quoted his media comments in their report concerning future ash dumping
strategies –
“All
of these statements have originated from uninformed sources. The reality is, as
usual somewhat different –
(a)
The Medical Officer of
Health was reported in the Jersey Evening Post on 7 September 1993 as follows:
“Dozens of people die every year from smoking related diseases such as cancer
and emphysema but not one death has been traced to refuse waste – if we
want to clean the atmosphere we should do something about it (smoking).”
A number of observations have to be made concerning Dr. Grainger’s
comments –
·
Smoking is indeed a
serious human health threat and that fact is widely known amongst the public,
most of whom are able to take decisions to cease their exposure to tobacco
smoke. People are generally unaware that that the ash is a threat to their
health, and the exposure of workers and the public to its toxic components is
entirely involuntary.
·
Exposure to the toxic
components of the ash of people who may face other health risks, such as
smoking or pre-existing medical conditions, represents an additional health burden – not
an alternative health burden.
·
Dr. Grainger refers
specifically to “refuse waste”, not the combined incinerator ash and its toxic
components – a demonstrably toxic material, tens of thousands of tons of
which are layered across the reclamation sites. The ash was dumped in a manner
that routinely exposed workers and the public to it.
·
Dr. Grainger
asserts that “not one death has been traced to refuse waste”. This assertion is
certainly wrong. For decades medical science and health protection experts have
recognised the fact that refuse waste, especially in concentrated dumps,
represents a variety of threats to human health. These include infection from
putrescent waste, threats from vermin, exposure to dusts from such material,
lung damage, the ingestion or inhalation of toxic substances in the refuse and
the potential for illnesses such as emphysema, cancer and renal failure as a
result of chronic, long-term exposure to hazardous substances emitted by waste
dumps, for example to the air or water supplies.
·
Can it be considered
remotely professional or ethically acceptable to simply brush aside and dismiss
public exposure to thousands of tonnes of material that contains a cocktail of
toxins, such as cadmium, mercury, arsenic, lead, dioxins, furans and PCBs, by
simply pointing to another hazard, such as smoking?
The attitude of Dr. Grainger came as no surprise to me, it being all of a piece with the self-interested denials of every other culpable States agency. In the early 1990s former Senator Nigel Querée and I arranged to meet with Dr. Grainger to discuss our concerns with the ash dumping. We pointed out that the ash was toxic and pre