MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT: PROPOSED REFORMS
_______________
Lodged au Greffe on 7th August 2001
by the Policy and Resources Committee
______________________________
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STATES
OF JERSEY
STATES GREFFE
180 2001 P.122
Price
code: E
PROPOSITION
THE STATES are asked
to decide whether they are of opinion -
(a) to agree that the Island’s present Committee
system of government should be replaced by a ministerial system, combined with
a system of scrutiny, as set out in the report of the Policy and Resources
Committee dated 26th July 2001 and that this objective should be achieved in
the following manner -
(i) the
Committee system of government will be abolished;
(ii) the
States will appoint a Chief Minister of Jersey from among their number who will
nominate a team of Ministers to form the Council of Ministers with the
executive function of government vested in the Chief Minister and the Council
of Ministers;
(iii) not more than 10 departments of government
will be established, each headed by a Minister, with power to appoint up to two
other members of the States to assist in his or her executive work, , subject
to the approval of the Chief Minister and to the condition set out in paragraph
(vii) below, with such members being able, if appropriate, to be so involved in
the work of more than one department;
(iv) the States will form a Procedure Committee,
comprised of members of the States who are not involved in the Executive, to be
responsible to the States for all aspects of Assembly procedure including, in
particular, scrutiny arrangements and an appropriate code of conduct for all
members of the States;
(v) the
States, upon the recommendation of the Procedure Committee, will establish
a small number of Scrutiny Committees, comprised of
members of the States not involved in the Executive, the function of such
committees, in support of the paramount role
of the States Assembly in such matters, being to examine the performance of
government, to scrutinise legislation and to contribute to the development of
policy;
(vi) the States will establish a Public Accounts
Committee, comprised of the chairmen of the Scrutiny Committees together with
at least one other member of the States not involved in the Executive, charged with the
scrutiny of public expenditure and supported by an Auditor General accountable
directly to the States Assembly;
(vii) the revised structure will be designed to
ensure that the number of members of the States not involved in the Executive
will always be in the majority ;
the Council of
Ministers will be supported by a Chief Executive who will be the head of the
civil service, which will be unified at senior level with heads of departments sitting on a Corporate
Management Board chaired by the Chief Executive;
the States will
establish an independent Appointments Commission, made up of non-States
Members, with responsibility for ensuring that the most senior civil service
appointments are properly made and free from undue political influence, and
which as its first task will recommend to the States a person for appointment
as Chief Executive
the Council of
Ministers will set up and lead a Liaison Group between the executive and the
parishes to keep under review the
relationship in the proposed new governmental arrangements between the centre
and the parishes.
(b) to request the Policy and Resources Committee
to present to the States, before the end of November 2001, an implementation
plan showing how these changes should be brought into effect.
POLICY AND RESOURCES
COMMITTEE
Notes: 1. The
Finance and Economics Committee...
2. The
Human Resources Committee...
PROPOSITION
THE STATES are asked to decide whether they are of
opinion -
(a) to agree that the Island’s present
committee system of government should be replaced by a ministerial system,
combined with a system of scrutiny, as set out in the report of the Policy and
Resources Committee dated 26th July 2001 and that this objective should be
achieved in the following manner -
(i) the committee system of government will be abolished;
(ii) the States will appoint a Chief Minister of
Jersey from among their number, by a process to be agreed, who will nominate a
team of ministers
to form the Council of Ministers, with the executive function of government vested
in the Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers;
(iii) not more than ten departments of
government will be established, each headed by a minister, with power
to appoint up to two other members of the States to assist in his or her
executive work, subject to the approval of the Chief Minister and to the
condition set out in paragraph (vii) below, with such members being able, if
appropriate, to be so involved in the work of more than one
department;
(iv) the States will form a Procedure Committee
to be responsible to the States for all aspects of Assembly procedure
including, in particular, scrutiny arrangements and an appropriate code of
conduct for all members of the States;
(v) the States will establish, upon the basis of conditions and terms of reference to
be drawn up by the Procedure Committee, a
small number of scrutiny committees, comprised of members of the States not
involved in the Executive, the function of such committees being, in support of
the overriding role of the States Assembly in such matters, to contribute to the
development of policy, to scrutinise legislation, and to examine the
performance of government;
(vi) the States will establish a Public Accounts
Committee, comprised of the chairmen of the scrutiny committees
together with at least one other member of the States not involved in the
Executive, charged with the scrutiny of public expenditure and supported by an
Auditor General accountable directly to the States Assembly;
(vii) the revised structure will be designed to
ensure that the number of members of the States who are not involved in the
Executive will be greater than those who are;
(viii) the Council of Ministers will be supported by a
Chief Executive who will be the head of the civil service, which will be
unified at senior level; and heads of departments will form a management
board under the leadership of the Chief Executive;
(ix) the States will establish an independent
Appointments Commission, comprising persons who are not members of the States,
with responsibility for ensuring that senior civil service appointments are
properly made, and which as its first task will recommend to the States a
person for appointment as Chief Executive;
(x) the Council of Ministers will establish a Liaison
Group to consider service
delivery and
resource allocation issues as between the Executive and the parishes
and to keep under review the relationship between the Executive and the
parishes;
(b) to request the Policy and Resources
Committee to present to the States, before the end of November 2001, an
implementation plan showing how and when these changes should be brought into
effect.
POLICY AND RESOURCES
COMMITTEE
Notes: 1. The Finance and Economics Committee’s
comments are to follow.
2. The Human Resources Committee’s comments
are to follow.
REPORT
1. Introduction
1.1 In
bringing forward its proposals for reforming the Island’s machinery of
government, the Committee has worked from the fundamental premise that the
system needs to change. This was the clear signal from the States’ decision to
establish the Review of the Machinery of Government in 1998, and also from the
Clothier Report published in January 2001. The Committee believes that the need
for change is widely accepted both in the States itself and in the community at
large. There is a widespread public perception that the Island’s government is
inefficient, indecisive, poorly co-ordinated, and out of touch with the demands
and pressures of a modern society.
1.2 The
Policy and Resources Committee believes that this perception is well-founded,
and it is for this reason that it is coming forward with a wide-ranging set of
proposals for change. These proposals have been arrived at only after a lengthy
period of consultation and reflection, and the Committee has given careful
attention to the many views that have been expressed from all quarters.
1.3 In
essence, the Committee is recommending that the Island’s machinery of
government should move from the present committee arrangements to a ministerial
system, combined with a system of scrutiny. The Committee’s proposals flow from
those which were set out in the Clothier Report, but the Committee has taken a
view on which aspects of that report should be taken forward now, in relation
to the core objective of a change to a ministerial system combined with a
system of scrutiny, and those which require more thought or should be taken
separately as issues in their own right in due course.
1.4 The
Committee is greatly indebted to Sir Cecil Clothier and his team for the work
they have undertaken in reviewing the Island’s system of government. The Panel
conducted its work effectively and diligently over a period of almost two
years, and faithfully completed the task that it was assigned.
2. Background
2.1 There
have been calls for change to the Island’s system of government for many years,
but the present debate could be said to have started in January 1998, when a
workshop of States members and Chief Officers considered the role and
responsibilities of the Policy and Resources Committee, as well as the more
general question of the strategic and corporate management of the States.
2.2 As
a result of these discussions, in July 1998 the Policy and Resources Committee
lodged “au Greffe” a report and proposition,
(Strategic and corporate management of the States: (P.164/98)) in which it
stated that it was firmly of the opinion that there was a need for a general
review of the machinery of government, and that this review should be carried
out by a body totally independent of the States which should consult widely
throughout the Island.
2.3 In
adopting the
Committee’s proposition, on 1st September 1998, the States
agreed, in principle, to the
appointment of an independent body to undertake a review of all aspects of the
machinery of government in Jersey. and tThe Policy and
Resources Committee was asked to bring back terms of reference together with
nominations for the chairmanship and membership of the review body.
2.4 On
19th January 1999 the Committee lodged “au Greffe” a proposition (Review of the
machinery of government: terms of reference and membership: (P.13/99)),
which recommended the membership and terms of reference for the Review Body. . The
terms of reference were presented in a manner designed to ensure that the scope
of the review would be as wide as possible, covering all aspects of the
machinery of government, with the exception of the constitutional relationships
between the Island and the United Kingdom and the European Union.
2.5 The
terms of reference were the subject of an amendment from Senator Stuart Syvret
which proposed that the Review Body should also examine the machinery of
government in the context of transparency, democratic responsiveness and the
need for checks and balances (Review
of the machinery of government: terms of reference and membership
(P.13/99) - second amendments (P.19/99)).
2.6 On
2nd March 1999 the States adopted the Committee’s proposition, together with
Senator Syvret’s amendments, and agreed to appoint a panel to undertake
a review of all aspects of the machinery of government in Jersey with the
following terms of reference -
“to consider whether the present machinery
of government in Jersey is appropriate to the task of determining,
co-ordinating, effecting and monitoring all States’ policies and the delivery
of all public services; including -
the
composition, operation and effectiveness of the States Assembly;
the
composition, operation and effectiveness of the Committees of the States;
the
role and respective responsibilities of the States, the Committees and the
Departments in achieving an efficient and effective strategic and business
planning and resource allocation process;
the
role of the Bailiff;
the
transparency, accountability and democratic responsiveness of the States
Assembly and Committees of the States; and
whether the
machinery of government is presently subject to checks and balances sufficient
to safeguard the public good and the rights of individuals;
but excluding -
the
constitutional relationship between the Bailiwick and the United Kingdom; and
the
constitutional relationship between the Bailiwick and the European Union;
and to make
recommendations to the Policy and Resources Committee on how the present
machinery of government could be improved.”.
2.7 The
States also agreed that the membership of the panel should comprise five local
residents and four persons resident outside the Island, with an independent
chairman, as follows -
Non-local
Sir
Cecil Clothier KCB, QC (Chairman)
Sir
Kenneth Percy Bloomfield, KCB
Professor
Sir Maurice Shock
Professor
Michael Gilbert Clarke CBE
Local
Mr.
John Henwood, MBE
Mrs.
Anne Elizabeth Perchard
Mr.
Geoffrey Colin Powell, OBE
Advocate
John Daniel Kelleher
Advocate
David Fisher Le Quesne
2.8 All
the non-local members of the Review Panel had extensive, relevant experience,
with particular reference to United Kingdom central and local government, and the two
professors brought with them national reputations in governmental reform. The
local members were all residents of long-standing who were well-known and
respected in the community.
2.9 Over
the next two years the Review Panel considered a large body of evidence
relating to the Island’s machinery of government. From the very outset the
panel resolved to give close attention to the views of the wider public and in
so doing interviewed over 130 witnesses and received over 160 written
submissions. It also held an extensively advertised public meeting in St.
Helier and sampled public opinion through an opinion poll that was conducted on
its behalf by MORI.
3. The
Clothier Report and the consultation process
3.1 The
report of the Review Panel on the Machinery of Government in Jersey (the
“Clothier Report”) was published on 15th January 2001 and presented to the
States on the following day. The Report received widespread coverage in the
local media and, in view of the extensive publicity and general availability of
the document, the Committee does not propose to give a detailed account of its
contents here. However, a general summary of the report’s recommendations is
provided for ease of reference at Appendix
1One.
3.2 The
Clothier Report was critical of many aspects of the Island’s system of
government. One of its main criticisms was that the Island lacked a clear
centre of governmental authority and that this prevented it from reacting in a
timely and decisive manner to the challenges of a modern society. The report
went on to make a series of recommendations that amounted to a comprehensive
plan for the revision of the system of government in Jersey. These
recommendations encompassed many important areas of government, including the
electoral system, the composition of the States Assembly and the role of the
Bailiff.However, t The most
fundamental recommendation was that the present committee arrangements should
be replaced by a ministerial system combined with a system of scrutiny.
3.3 In
the weeks following publication the Clothier Report provoked a considerable
degree of public comment. There were many who welcomed the Report for the
breadth and depth of its recommendations. However, some disagreed, in whole or
in part, with the Report’s recommendations, claiming that it had failed to take
sufficient note of the advantages of the present system. It is fair to say
though, that there was very little support for the view that there should be no
change at all to the present arrangements.
3.4 The
Review Panel was criticised in some quarters on the grounds that it had not
considered other government models before producing its recommendations. The
Committee, however, believes that this criticism was unjustified in that it
failed to take proper note of the Panel’s terms of reference, which in this
respect were to “make recommendations to the Policy and Resources Committee on
how the present machinery of government could be improved”. and that tThe Panel had
indeed considered a range of options, but had concluded from the weight of
evidence that change along the lines that it eventually recommended would offer
the best way forward.
3.5 The
Policy and Resources Committee wished to ensure that the public had a full
opportunity to comment on the Clothier Report and its recommendations and
established a Steering Group, consisting of three members of the Committee,
namely Senator Pierre Horsfall (Chairman), Senator Len Norman, and Senator
Nigel Quérée, to oversee the mechanics of the consultation timetable. In
addition, two officers were seconded from other States Departments to support
the consultation process.
3.6 The
first step in the consultation process was to send out summary copies of the
Clothier Report to every household in the Island. Copies of the summary were
also translated into Portuguese and made generally available. Members of the
public were then invited to submit their written comments to the Committee by
19th March,
although this deadline was later extended to the beginning of April 2001.
3.7 In
addition, a public meeting was held at Fort Regent on the evening of 15th March
which was
broadcast live by Radio Jersey. This meeting provided an opportunity for
Islanders to express their views and ask questions of both local and non-local
members of the Clothier Panel.
3.8 While
this public consultation process was in progress, the Committee decided that
it also wished to promote discussion within the States organisation. First, the
Committee sought
the initial views of other States Committees on the Clothier Report and its
recommendations, and then States members and Chief Officers were invited to an
informal all-day meeting on 27th February. At this very
well-attended meeting there was a wide-ranging and constructive discussion,
which included a presentation from and a discussion with members of the
Clothier Panel.
3.9 At
that same meeting it was decided by those States members present that the
membership of the Policy and Resources Committee’s ad hoc Steering Group should
be extended to include nine other States members and, as a result of a ballot
held shortly afterwards, the following nine additional members of the
Steering Group were elected to the group -
Senator
Christopher Lakeman
Connétable
Mac Pollard
Deputy
Ken Syvret, MBE
Senator
Wendy Kinnard
Senator
Stuart Syvret
Deputy
Mike Vibert
Deputy
Paul Routier
Deputy
Roy Le Hérissier
Deputy
Gerald Voisin
4. The
Steering Group
4.1 The
first meeting of the newly enlarged Steering Group took place on 8th March
2001, and at the outset it was agreed that the Group’s remit should be “to
recommend a way forward on the reform of the machinery of government”. The
Group discussed the recommendations in the Clothier Report and the general
consensus of opinion was that there were two key areas for consideration,
namely the proposals for a ministerial system and for a system of scrutiny. The
Group did not have a view at this stage on whether or not it would be desirable
to move to a ministerial system with a system of scrutiny, but it did agree that
the implications of any such move would be crucial to the Island’s system of
government,
and therefore these
issues should be given priority
consideration.priority should therefore be given to the
consideration of these issues.
4.2 However,
before examiningconsidering
these issues in detail, the Group agreed that it should begin by going back to
first principles and examining what was meant by “good government”. This could
be done reaching agreement on a set of criteria, which could then be used for
evaluating various options for a system of government. In this connection the
Group agreed that it should not restrict itself solely to an examination of the
recommendations in the Clothier Report, but that it should also look at other
possible options for a system of government.
4.3 4.3Another
informal meeting of States members was held on 20th March, and at this meeting
agreement was reached on a set of criteria that could be used by the Steering
Group in its assessment of various options for a system of government,
and;.
It was also agreed that the Steering Group should consider the following
four different options for government reform -
· Continuing with the
present system of government: In this option there would be no significant
changes to the current system of government.
· Reducing the number of
States Committees: This option would involve reducing the number of States
Committees with the aim of providing a greater degree of co-ordination.
· Having a modified
committee system with more co-ordination and scrutiny: As well as reducing
the number of committees, this option would give a stronger mandate to the
Policy and Resources Committee. It would also include the creation of Scrutiny
Committees.
· Moving to a
ministerial system/system of scrutiny: This would entail the replacement of
Committees with a ministerial system, together with a system of independent
scrutiny by those in the States not involved in the ‘executive’ side of
government. This option would be based closely on the recommendations in the
Clothier Report, and for the purposes of this report it is described as the
“Ministerial/Clothier” option.
4.4 In
the weeks immediately after this meeting the Steering Group met on several
occasions to discuss the criteria and evaluate the options that had been
proposed. The Group further decided that -
· the criteria for assessing good government could be grouped
under four main headings, namely “Democratic Government”, “Coherent
Government”, “Decisive Government”, and “Effective Scrutiny”, together with an
additional heading of “Public Acceptability”;
· in relation to the criteria for good government ,
the
list of 29 which had been identified by States members, should include a reference to the need for
high ethical standards in public life, and that the
criterion of “Transparency/Standards in public life - keeping the public
informed” should accordingly be added; and
· as the criterion of “Accountability” had featured more than
once in the original list, the list should be amended slightly so that it
featured only once.
This
resulted in agreement
on a revised list of 29 criteria under five main headings
being agreed.
4.5 All
of the five main headings and the criteria were then assigned weightings which,
in the Group’s opinion, reflected their relative importance.
4.6 A
copy of the revised list of criteria, together with the weightings assigned by
the Group, is attached as Appendix 2.
4.7 At
this point the Group then began giving more detailed consideration to each of
the four options that had been identified for a system of government. Other
possible options had been discussed during the Steering Group’s meetings, and
it was agreed that two of those should also be included in the evaluation
exercise. These were as follows -
· A modified Committee
system with more co-ordination, but without Scrutiny Committees :
This
was similar to the third option identified by States members on 20th March (see
paragraph 4.4), except that it did not include scrutiny committees; and
· A Combined Committee/Ministerial
Option: This option combined elements of both the present committee system
and a ministerial system of government. The number of States Committees would
be reduced to nine or ten Committees/Ministries, each with a Minister/President
and a small number of other States members. Three scrutiny committees would
also be created. Unlike the Ministerial/Clothier option, the majority of States
members would exercise both executive and scrutiny functions, i.e. through
membership of not more than one executive committee, and of one or more
scrutiny committees.
4.8 The
Steering Group members proceeded to assess each of these six options according
to the agreed criteria, and results of individual assessments were collated and
the average scores calculated. The agreed weightings were then applied to
produce overall scores and the results are shown in Appendix 3.
Note: At every stage this work was carried out in
consultation with the Statistics Unit of the Policy and Resources Department.
4.9 The
results of the Steering Group exercise showed a clear margin in favour of two
of the options. The system that scored most highly was the Ministerial/Clothier
option and this was followed by the Combined Committee/Ministerial option. The
lowest-scoring option was the present system of government, with a total score
that was well under half of that received for each of the two highest-scoring
alternatives. This latter result was entirely consistent with the fact that
virtually no argument had been heard or presented which had advocated that the
present system should remain unchanged.
4.10 It
is worth
noting that -
· the results were based on the averages of the scores
received, rather than on the views of each individual Group member, and the
process that was followed therefore ensured that the results provided a
representative view of the Group as a whole; and;
· the results were arrived at only after a lengthy process of
discussion by 12 States members, representing many different shades of opinion,
and with extensive experience of the States.
4.11 The
Steering Group did not restrict itself solely to the evaluation exercise, but
it also discussed many of the issues that had been raised in the Clothier
Report.
4.12 One
of the main subjects for discussion was the issue of scrutiny, and the general
consensus of opinion was that the present scrutiny arrangements were very
deficient. It was felt that it was important to have a government system
involving scrutiny committees, and that these committees would have to be
properly resourced.
4.13 Having
been charged with recommending a way forward on the machinery of government,
the Steering Group agreed that it should give further consideration to the two
highest-scoring options, i.e. the Clothier/Ministerial option and the Combined
Committee/Ministerial option. The Steering Group’s comments on these two
options were then forwarded to the Committee for its consideration. A copy of
the Steering Group’s comments is attached as Appendix 4.
5. Policy and Resources Committee -
review and formulation of its proposals
5.1 Throughout
the consultation process the Policy and Resources Committee listened
attentively to the debate and took note of the views expressed by the wider
public, as
well as by States members. The Committee also noted the consensus of opinion on
the Steering Group that there were two key areas for consideration in the
Clothier Report, namely the proposals for a ministerial system and for a system
of scrutiny.
5.2 The
Committee also considered the principles of government which could be said to
underlie the Clothier Report, and agreed that these were all principles to
which it would wholeheartedly subscribe. These principles were -
· that government should be truly democratic in that it should
strive to be close to the public, and that the
public needed to feel that they could have an effect on government;
· that government should be decisive, and that government
decisions should be clear, coherent, and consistent;
· that government should be held accountable through being
subject to effective scrutiny, and that scrutiny could only be truly effective
if there was a division between the executive and scrutiny functions; and
· that
those who exercised the scrutiny function should be in the majority.
5.3 The
Committee then turned to the two options that had scored most highly in the
Steering Group’s evaluation exercise, namely the Ministerial/Clothier (MC)
option and the Combined Committee/Ministerial (CCM) option. Having considered
the CCM option in some detail, the Committee decided that this option would be
unsatisfactory for several reasons, and would still retain many of the problems
encountered in the present system.
5.4 One
of these problems relates to the manner in which executive authority is
exercised. In the CCM option the minister will be the head of a
ministry/committee of not more than four other States members, and it is
understood that the ministries as a whole would be charged with taking
executive decisions and developing policy and legislation, much as committees
do under the present system. Under these arrangements there is the potential
for disruption to the decision-making process.
5.5 For
example, as part of the normal activity of government a minister will be a
party to the policy decisions taken by the Council of Ministers and some of
these decisions will naturally relate to his or her own area of responsibility.
However, the minister will be placed in a very difficult position if his or her
committee does not agree with these decisions. A situation could also arise in
which a head of department will receive conflicting directions from more than
one source, e.g. from his or her committee and from the head of the civil
service.
5.6 Another
potential drawback with the CCM option relates to the activity of scrutiny. In
this system nearly all States members would continue to serve as ministers or
as committee members, and would thus be involved in the executive. This would
mean that the ability to exercise scrutiny independently of the executive
function would be compromised.
5.7 After
further discussion and reflection, the Committee has decided that its preferred
choice is along the lines of the Ministerial/Clothier (MC) option. The
Committee believes that this option willwould
embody the principles of democratic, decisive, accountable and effective
government, and willwould
also meet the criteria for good government that have been agreed by States
members.
5.8 The
Committee’s proposals are based on having a ministerial system combined with a
system of scrutiny, and it considers that both are essential to the new
arrangements. These systems should be regarded as being inter-linked, and the
way in which they will work is described in more detail in sections 6 and 7.
6. The
ministerial system
6.1 Before
describing the ministerial system, it should be emphasised that the Committee’s
proposals will not detract from the power of the States Assembly, and the
function of the Assembly as the Island’s seat of government will remain paramount.
The States would continue to be the
Island’s legislature, and general policies would be approved by the Assembly as they are now. The Assembly would also continue
to take those major executive decisions that do not fall within States-approved
policies.
Examples are decisions to adopt the capital and revenue expenditure budgets, to
build a new school or hospital, or to create a Territorial Army Unit.
legislative,
policy-making, and executive powers of the Assembly will not be any different
from the current system under the Committee’s proposals.
6.2 Under
present arrangements the day to day business of the Island is conducted by
Committees which are appointed by the States and have delegated areas of
responsibility. Committees are all subject to decisions of the States, except
where they are given specific powers and duties by legislation. The
responsibilities of individual Committees vary enormously, but the majority of
them are responsible for providing a public service, such as health or
education. All propositions for the passing of new legislation, together with
any significant policy proposals, have to be referred by Committees to other
Committees and then to the States Assembly for a decision.
6.3 It
is proposed that the present system of Committees, together with its supporting
administrative arrangements and infrastructure, should be abolished and
replaced by a ministerial system of government. This means that the present
Committee responsibilities would be taken on by individual ministers, each of
whom would be responsible for a particular area or department of government. As
with the present system, the States would remain the supreme decision-making
body and any new legislation and major policy proposals would have to be
referred to the States.
6.4 How
will this affect the decision-making process? At the level of the States
Assembly there would be no significant change. At a ministerial level, the
executive decisions will be taken by a minister rather than by a States Committee. Ministers
would be able to appoint up to one or two other States members to assist them
(“Assistant Ministers”), but they would retain direct accountability and would
have the authority to override their more junior colleagues if they did not
agree with them. .
6.5 In
some departments the need for assistant ministers may not be significant, but
in other cases the workload may be more considerable and a minister may decide
to appoint one or two assistant ministers. In these cases the assistant
ministers may have a purely advisory role, but he or she might also be given delegated authority by
the minister to act in certain areas, e.g. in deciding upon individual
applications in line with agreed policy. It is further proposed that the
assistant ministers should be able, if appropriate, to support the work of more than one minister.
6.6 The
Committee believes that the role of the minister and assistant ministers will
develop over time, and it is therefore difficult at this stage to provide
detailed lists of their responsibilities. For the purposes of guidance,
however, the Committee has compiled lists of the responsibilities as they are
presently envisaged, and these are attached as Appendix 55.
6.7 It
has been claimed that the ministerial system could lead to a highly
unsatisfactory situation whereby a minister might seek to assume unlimited
authority and that in this event there would be no real checks on his or her
decisions. This claim is not accepted. In the proposed new system the minister
will at all times remain subject to the authority of the States, and to the
collective responsibility of the Chief Minister and Council of Ministers. He or
she will also be subject to regular public scrutiny under arrangements that are
described in section 7. Thus, accountability will be clearly attributable to
one minister, who will be held to account if he or she is not performing to the
required standard.
6.8 As
already noted, each minister would be assigned a particular area of
responsibility. It is not proposed, however, that the 24 States Committees
which exist at present should each be replaced by 24 ministers. It is the
Committee’s view that this number is unwieldy, and that government efficiency
and co-ordination would be greatly improved if there were a significantly lower
number of ministries.
6.9 The
Clothier Panel has recommended that there should be seven ministers, each with
their own departments, but in the Committee’s view this number would be
difficult to achieve, at least in the short term, and a number between seven
and ten would be more desirable. Subject to States’ approval of the principle
of moving to a ministerial system, the Committee would intend to provide the
Assembly with an implementation plan showing how the present Committee
responsibilities could be reallocated to new departments.
6.10 This
now brings us to the key question of how the work of the ministers would be
co-ordinated, for there would be little merit in introducing a system in which
there was constant disagreement between ministers about policy and priorities.
The Committee believes that the necessary co-ordination,
and cohesiveness, and integration can and should be provided
by a Council of Ministers. This Council would have several key functions.
Firstly, it would approve the policies formulated by each ministry/department.
Secondly, the Council would be required to consider and take action on policy and other issues that cut across
departmental responsibilities, thereby ensuring the coherent delivery of
services to the public, many of which have a high degree of inter-dependence.
Thirdly, the Council would be charged with preparing a general policy document
on a regular basis that would be submitted to the States for its approval. This
policy document would provide a general review of the States’ plans,
priorities, and programmes; would set out the statement of aims and objectives;
and would provide the policy framework within which the executive and others
would act.
6.11 It
will be seen from the above that the delegated authority of the Council of
Ministers will be subordinate to that of the States and that any new
legislation and major policy proposals will still have to be referred on to the
States Assembly for a decision. The Council of Ministers will, nonetheless, have the authoritybe
given the power to give directions to individual departments if
this should become necessary, e.g. if a department should fail to act in
accordance with agreed policies. The Committee believes that this authority
will help to ensure proper co-ordination and integration ofwithin
the States organisation., although in
practice it is not anticipated that the power
to give directions would need to be exercised very often.
6.12 Further
information on the role and responsibilities of the Council of Ministers is
given in Appendix 5.
6.13 There
remains one key question in relation to the proposals for a ministerial system,
and that is who would lead the Council of Ministers. It is proposed that the
Council should be led by a Chief Minister, who would be appointed by the States
and would act as chairman of the Council of Ministers. He or she would be
regarded as head of the executive arm of the Island’s government and, as the
chairman of the Council, he or she would be required to lead a team of
ministers and to play an important role in maintaining and co-ordinating the
Island’s government.
6.14 The Chief Minister He
or she would also have responsibility for external relations and,
when necessary, would act as the Island’s representative in international
matters. The Lieutenant
Governor’s role would remain unchanged in this respect, and the Bailiff would
continue to be kept fully informed.
The role of the Lieutenant Governor would remain unchanged in this
respect, and the Bailiff as civic head would continue to be the official channel
of communication so that he could exercise his role as defender of the
Island’s constitution. In this capacity, the Bailiff would maintain the protection afforded by official
correspondence passing through the hands of the Crown Officers, thus ensuring that
no harm to the Island’s
constitutional rights be inadvertently conceded.
6.15 It
is not proposed that the Chief Minister should be given specific powers of
direction over
other departments, as these would rest with the Council of Ministers, although of course
the Chief Minister would have powers of direction over his/her own department.
As with the ministers, it should be emphasised that the Chief Minister would
remain subject at all times to the authority of the States. In this connection
it is proposed that there should be a mechanism whereby a proposition could
be brought to
the States,
with the support of a minimum number of States members, asking the Assembly
to resolve that it has may resolve that it has no confidence in the Chief Minister or
any other minister.,
and that any such proposition must have the support of a specified number of
States Members.
6.1614 The Chief Minister will be taking on a
very important role in the Island’s system of government, and in accepting this
major responsibility it seems only reasonable that he or she should be able to
select a team of ministers that will work well togetherwith him or her.
The Committee is therefore proposing that the Chief Minister should be able to
nominate his or her team of ministers for approval by the States. This means
that the actual power of appointment will rest with the States, and that the
Chief Minister will play a key part in the appointment process. There would also
need to be provision for the appointment of a Deputy Chief Minister.
6.175 In a similar vein, it is proposed that
the Chief Minister should have the right to approve or dismiss
assistant ministers who have been selected by ministers, and that he or she would also have the right to
recommend to the States that a minister should be dismissed. In the Clothier
Report it is proposed that the Chief Minister should have the power to dismiss
ministers (paragraph 5.2), but in the Committee’s view it is preferable
that the power to both appoint and dismiss ministers should rest with the
States Assembly, upon the recommendation of the Chief Minister.
6.18 6Further
information on the role and responsibilities of the Chief Minister is given in Appendix 5.
6.19 7The
Committee believes that its proposals for a ministerial system should lead to
dramatic improvements to the Island’s machinery of government. The
decision-making process should become more timely and efficient, and decisions
will be taken at the right level because the levels of executive responsibility
will be clearly defined and properly understood. Unlike the present cCommittee
system, it will not be necessary for items of business to pass from one
committee to another, which can cause lengthy delays. In the new arrangements
many items will be dealt with at the level of the individual ministry, whilst
those with more corporate implications (e.g. the allocation of resources) will need to be considered
bybe referred to just one body, namely
the Council of Ministers.
6.20 18The
Committee also believes that it will be important to build on existing
relationships between Island-wide governmentcentral government
and local Parish government, to ensure that the delivery of services, the
allocation of resources, and executive functions are appropriately and properly
distributed to the level of best effectiveness. To this end, it is proposed
that a formal Liaison Group be established so as to enable the executive and
the parishes to link and work closely together.
6.21 19The
move from a committee to a ministerial system is obviously very significant,
and there will need to be a change to the way in which support is provided from
the civil service. It is proposed that each of the ministers
will be supported by aone or more
civil service heads of department, and also that the heads of
department will form a management board under the leadership of a Chief
Executive. Such
a structure at official level will enable the Council of Ministers to receive the advice it
may need in relation to corporate matters, resulting in the integrated delivery
of public
services.
and that the Council of Ministers will be
supported by a corporate management board,
chaired by a Chief Executive and consisting of the main heads of department.
This management board will act as the executive arm of the Council of
Ministers, and will provide the Council with the advice that it
needs in relation to corporate matters.
6.220 It must be borne in mind, however, that
the Committee’s proposals in respect of a ministerial system are only part of
the story. To be truly effective and democratic, the authority held by the
executive should be balanced by a system of scrutiny and this is described in
more detail in section 7.
7. A system
of scrutiny
7.1 Before
examining the Committee’s proposals for a system of scrutiny, it is worth
considering what is actually meant by the word “scrutiny”. Scrutiny can be
defined simply as “close observation”, but in a government context it is
intended to mean something more. For these purposes scrutiny should be regarded
as embracing three main activities, namely participation in the development of
policy, the review of legislation, and the examination of the performance of
government.
7.2 All
three scrutiny activities are clearly very important to the work of government,
but who should actually carry out them out? In the present system this is done
by both the States Assembly and individual States members. For example, an
individual member may currently make representations to a States Committee
about a major area of policy that is under discussion, and the Committee will
take this submission into account when drawing up its policy proposals for
presentation to the States. The States Assembly will then examine the policy
proposals and will discuss them in open debate before coming to a decision. Any
proposals presented to the States can be the subject of amendments from
individual members.
7.3 Under
the proposed system, both States members and the Assembly would still carry out
the scrutiny function, and indeed the Committee believes it to be essential
that this should continue. There would, of course, be a difference in that
executive authority would rest with ministers rather than States Committees. There
is a further difference because mMinisters would be held individually
accountable for their departments, and would thus be clearly identifiable. All
ministers, including the Chief Minister, could be questioned by States members
on their performance and policies. In the new arrangements a States member would still have the right
to take an active part in the scrutiny process on an individual basis, e.g. by asking
questions in the States, or by bringing private members’ propositions.
7.4 One
of the key aspects of the Committee’s proposals is that there should be a
division between the executive and scrutiny functions. Those members who would
carry out the scrutiny function could then be said to be truly independent,
because they would not have a particular stake in any one aspect of the
executive. .
It is also proposed that those
who are not involved in the executive should be in the majority. ,
and this should ensure that the executive will always be outnumbered in the
Assembly.
Although the present system allows for a variety
of types of scrutiny, the Committee is of the view that the scrutiny function
is not as effective as it should be. In order to ensure a proper separation of interestspowers,
the scrutiny function needs to be structured and independent of the executive.
7.57 The scrutiny function also needs to
be open and transparent if it is to be truly effective. The Committee therefore
proposes that there should be a culture of consultation throughout government,
by means such as the introduction of consultation guidelines, including
such items such asintroducing the regular use of “green” and
“white” papers, and the formation of a small number of focused focused
scrutiny committees.
7.68 The arrangements for scrutiny would
be achieved by appointing a Procedure Committee which would be responsible to
the States Assembly for all matters of procedure. The Procedure Committeession
would in effect be a development of the present House Committee, but would take
on additional responsibilities in the new Assembly. As well as its standing
brief in relation to scrutiny arrangements, the Procedure Committee would be
required to develop and maintain a code of conduct for all States members and
to propose revisions to the Standing Orders of the States of Jersey so that
they can be adapted to the new arrangements. It would also be necessary to
introduce and maintain supplementary codes of conduct that would be applicable
to the ministers and the Chief Minister.
7.7 It
is proposed that formal scrutiny be effected through the establishment of formal
“Scrutiny Committees”. One of the first tasks for the Procedure
Committee would be to consider and recommend the terms of reference and
conditions for the scrutiny committees, and these recommendations would then be
submitted to the States Assembly for approval. It has been suggested, for
example, that there might be one scrutiny committee concerned with the
economy of the Island, another with the Island’s environment,
and a third with the direct services that are provided to the public.on
the Economy, one on the Environment, and a third on Direct Services to the
public.
7.8 The
Procedure Committee might also decide to recommend to the States arrangements
for the appointment of ad hoc scrutiny committees, as and when necessary, for
the examination of particular issues.
7.9 Public
expenditure is one of the key aspects of government, and it is therefore being
proposed that one of the scrutiny committees should be a Public Accounts
Committee. This Committee would be charged with scrutinising all aspects of
public expenditure, and it would comprise the chairmen of the scrutiny
committees, plus at least one other States member not involved in the
executive. The Committee would be supported by an Auditor General, independent
of any States department and directly accountable to the States Assembly, who
would be responsible for providing auditing leadership and co-ordination of the
audit function across all aspects of public expenditure. The scrutiny function
of the Public Accounts Committee would not extend to involvement in the
formulation and development of policy, as this could potentially be in conflict
with the Committee’s prime responsibility for scrutinising public expenditure,
e.g. in the event that the Committee were called upon to scrutinise expenditure
in a service area which it had previously advocated.
7.10 Each
scrutiny committee would carry out all of the three main activities of scrutiny
referred to in paragraph 7.1 above, i.e. contributing to the development
of policy, scrutinising legislation, and examining the performance of
government (with the exception of the Public Accounts Committee in the area
described in paragraph 7.911
above). These are all key functions of government, and the Committee believes
that all States members who are not involved in the executive should have the
opportunity to be actively involved in the work of scrutiny committees.
7.11 The Committee feels
that the significance and benefits arising from the work of the scrutiny committees should
not be under-estimated. The scrutiny committees should provide individual States members with a more structured and
effective means of influencing government. In this connection it is worth
noting that scrutiny committees would be able to call for expert advice on matters of a
technical or specialised nature, and receive proper executive and
administrative support. They would also be able to call for relevant papers
and information, provided that access to this information was not prohibited
under the Code of Practice on Public Access to Official Information.
In drawing up its
proposals for scrutiny committees, the Policy and Resources Committee has taken
note of recent developments in the United Kingdom, especially at local
government level. The Committee has been in contact with people involved in
these changes, including both elected representatives and civil servants, and
in their view the introduction of scrutiny committees has been an extremely
positive development. All of them are adamant that the scrutiny function needs
to be independent of the executive, and that scrutiny committees have a vital
and constructive role to play in government.
7.123 It is proposed that meetings of the
scrutiny committees should be held in public, in order to promote greater
transparency and accountability in government. Further information regarding
the proposed roles and responsibilities of the scrutiny committees, as well as
the Procedure Committee, is given in Appendix
5.
7.134 If the Committee’s proposals are
approved by the States, it is proposed that there should be an independent
Appointments Commission, made up entirely of persons who are not members of the
States, with responsibility for ensuring that all senior civil service
appointments are properly made. One of the first tasks for the Appointments
Commission will be to recommend to the States a person for the appointment as
Chief Executive.
7.145 As part of the strategy for developing
a culture of consultation, one of the main proposals is that there should be a
regular and formalised use of “green” and “white” papers. These are forms of
consultation paper that would generally be issued by departments when they were
considering major changes in policy. A “green” paper would be issued at a
relatively early stage in the process of policy formulation, and States members,
scrutiny committees, and the general public would be invited to comment on the
contents. Once these comments had been taken into account, a department would
then formulate its proposals in more detail and issue a “white” paper, which
would again be the subject of comments from the public and scrutiny
committee(s). When this stage was completed, a department would formally define
its proposals for consideration by the Council of Ministers and onward
transmission to the States Assembly.
7.156 There is nothing radically new about
this aspect of the Committee’s proposals. What is new, however, is the proposal
that green and white papers should be a regular and integral part of the
policy-making process. Many States Committees have issued consultation papers
in the past, but this has by no means been a universal or consistent practice.
In future, more emphasis would be placed on the use of consultation papers, and
both the public and their elected representatives would become more involved in
the process of policy formulation.
7.16 7It
has been argued that the Committee’s proposals in respect of scrutiny, and in
particular in respect of the division between executive and scrutiny, are
“divisive”. It has further been argued that the Island’s government will become
more adversarial, with those who are in the scrutiny function feeling that they
have been excluded from government. The Committee believes that this argument
is completely incorrect, and that it results from a misunderstanding of the
nature of scrutiny. In the Committee’s view, scrutiny is not a second order
activity, but is fundamental to the nature of government. Scrutiny should not
be regarded as a negative activity, but as one in which there is constructive
engagement with the executive.
7.17 8Discussion
with elected members and civil servants in the United Kingdom have also
reinforced these views in that effective scrutiny leads to greater involvement
of elected members in government and a significantly reduced need for party
politics.
7.189 A scrutiny committee may, for example, requiresummons
a minister to attend
a meeting to respond to questionsquestion him or her
about a particular aspect of policy, and it may also call for briefings and
additional information. In the same way, a minister may requestask
a scrutiny committee to comment on a particular issue or policy. In the
Committee’s view, the relationship between the executive and scrutiny functions
will be based on mutual respect, with neither function being exempt from
criticism. The
comment has been made that the scrutiny committee should be regarded as a “critical friend”, offering comments
and advice in order to produce a better end result.
7.19 Clearly
the Committee’s proposals in respect of the scrutiny function will have
resource implications, and the scrutiny committees would need to be provided
with appropriate executive and administrative advice and support.
7.20 It
is also accepted that improvements should be made to the facilities that are
presently available to all States members, e.g.
offices, secretarial support, and research facilities. Whatever
the role of the individual States member, it is essential that they should be
provided with the resources that will enable them to carry out their work.
7.21 The
need for additional facilities, together with any resource implications, would
be considered in more detail in the Committee’s implementation plan.
8. The
Clothier Report - other recommendations
8.1 The
Committee has deliberately focused on developing proposals to establish a
ministerial system/system of scrutiny, as it sees this as being the area of
highest priority. However, the Committee also recognises that the Clothier
Report makes a number of other important recommendations which relate to the
structure and composition of the States, including electoral arrangements
and the role of Senator. These are subjects which should be
addressed, but the Committee believes that they can and should be considered
separately in their own right.
.
8.2 The
Committee has accordingly decided to ask its ad
hoc Steering Group to continue in its agreed task of “recommending a way
forward on the reform of the machinery of government”, and to look at the other
major issues that are referred to in the Clothier Report. These
issues includedare:-
the question of the Island-wide mandate and the role of Senator; the number of
members in the States; the role of Bailiff as President of the Assembly as
President of the Assembly; the question of whether Connétables
should cease to be ex officio members
of the States; the nomenclature of members of the Assembly; the question of
whether elections should all be held on the same day; and the other aspects of
the electoral process that are referred to in Chapter 2 of the Clothier Report.
, such as the
proposal that election expenses should be determined by the States.
Once t8.3 The Steering Group has completed its
examination of considered these issues, and its comments
are recorded in Appendix 4. The Committee is grateful to the Steering
Group for its work, and believes that it has made a constructive and thoughtful
contribution to the debate. The Group will in fact remain constituted so that
the Committee may call upon its services from time to time.
8.4 Having given
preliminary consideration to the Group’s comments, together with the
comments received during the consultation process earlier this year, the Committee has decided that more time is needed
for it to
discuss and reflect upon some of these matters.it
will report back to the Policy and Resources Committee and the Committee will
then decide on its preferred course of action. In some cases the Committee may
decide that recommendation for change is not necessary, whilst in others it may
decide to bring proposals forward to the States. However, the Committee
stresses that none of the above issues impact directly upon the decisions as to
how the States executive and scrutiny functions should be managed.
At this stage the
Committee believes that it would be inappropriate to express a view on any of
the issues referred to in paragraph 8.2, as this could be regarded as
pre-empting the work of the Steering Group. The Committee will want to review
these issues in the light of the feedback from the Steering Group, together
with the comments made during the consultation process
earlier this year,
before reaching a decision on how to proceed. It is not envisaged
that this will be a lengthy process, and the Committee will be in a position
to make a statement of its views by the end of September, before the current
proposals for a ministerial system and a system of scrutiny are debated in the
States.
would plan to
complete this aspect of its work by the end of this year. Any proposals arising
from this process would be submitted to the States shortly thereafter.
9.0 Implementation
plan and resource requirements
9.1 Clearly
the changes that are being proposed are of a very major nature, involving cultural
and organisational change, and the whole process wcould
take several years to implement. A change ofn this scale
will need to have an implementation plan, but clearly this type of plan will
take some time to prepare in any detail and the Committee believes that it
should first seek the approval of the States to the principle of moving to a
ministerial system and a system of scrutiny.
9.2 If
that approval is secured, the Committee intends to carry out detailed work on
an implementation plan that would be brought to the States by the end of
November 2001.
9.3 The
aim of this plan will be to set out, for detailed consideration -
· an indicative
timetable of the work that will be required to achieve the proposals set out in
the proposition and its supporting report;
· the process that is
envisaged for taking this work forward;
· a possible new Departmental structure;
· the proposed roles and
responsibilities of the main participants in the new system, i.e. the Chief
Minister, ministers, assistant ministers, and Council of Ministers, as well as
the Procedure Committee, Public Accounts Committee and other scrutiny
committees, together with the proposed indicative responsibilities of the Chief
Executive;
· the special
arrangements for particular regulatory functions, which require democratic
oversight and/or control, such as planning and development control, the
administration of the Housing Regulations, and the administration of the
Regulation of Undertakings and Development Law;
· the relationship
between the executive and the parishes, including the proposed
establishment of a Liaison Group with a remit to ensure the best possible
co-ordination between central government and the parishes;
· the legislative
changes that will be required to bring these proposals into effect.
9.4 On
this last point, the Committee acknowledges that its proposals will entail
significant changes to legislation, and the implementation plan will therefore
address this subject in more detail. From the discussions that have taken place
to date, it is likely that there would need to be a new States of Jersey Law,
as well as a large number of consequential amendments to other items of
legislation (i.e. amendments which will be necessary as a consequence of the
move from a committee to a ministerial system of government).
9.5 In
order to gain a more detailed picture of the extent and timescale of the work
that would be required, the Policy and Resources Department has established a
small group of senior officers to identify and agree upon those Laws which need
amendment, in
consultation with chief officers, and on the timescale in which this work can
reasonably be carried out. This group is charged with reporting back in time
for its conclusions to be included in the implementation plan.
9.6The
preliminary indication is that the legislative changes could be implemented by
April 2003 at the earliest. If this is achievable, the Committee recommends
that measures should be put into train now so that there would be no undue
delay in 2003. The Committee would also consider asking the
States whether it would be minded to postpone the next election until the
spring of that year.
Under the present
electoral arrangements the next senatorial and deputies’ elections are due to
take place in October and November 2002, and Committee Presidents and States
Committees would be appointed shortly thereafter in December 2002. The
advantage of postponing the elections until the spring of 2003 is that the
Assembly could be in a position to move straight to a ministerial system/system
of scrutiny, without the need for a transitionary period.
It
is clear that the Committee’s proposals will have resource implications, and
the implementation plan would seek to examine this matter in more detail. In
particular, the plan would consider the resources that will be needed to
support a ministerial system and a system of scrutiny, as well as the
additional facilities that should be provided for States members. In bringing forward
its proposals, the Committee acknowledges that adjustments may be needed in the light of changes in
circumstances, and the implementation plan will therefore need
to allow for a degree of flexibility.
9.7 9 The
Committee has already had discussions with the Treasury about the resource
implications and the next budget cycle, and an indicative budget for the period
September 2001 to May 2003 will be set out as part of the implementation plan.
This budget will cover such items as the estimated costs of preparing for the
move to a ministerial system and system of scrutiny which could take place in,
say, May 2003. The Committee has no doubt that its proposals will bring
efficiency savings in the medium to long term, but it acknowledges that an
initial investment will have to be made if these benefits are to be realised.
10. Conclusion
10. The
Committee believes that its proposals will result in major improvements to the
Island’s system of government. Jersey must adapt to face the challenges of the
future, both within and outside the Island, and it will be strongly placed to
meet these challenges if these proposals are adopted by the States.
10.2 The
Committee’s proposals may be summarised as follows -
(1) the Committee system of government will be
abolished;.
(2) the States will appoint a Chief Minister of
Jersey from among its number, by a process to be agreed;.
(3) the Chief Minister will nominate a team of
ministers for approval by the States to form the membership of a Council of
Ministers. The executive function of government will be vested in the Chief
Minister and the Council of Ministers;.
(4) not more than ten departments of government
will be established, each headed by a member of the Council of Ministers;.
(5) ministers will be able to appoint up to two
States members, who may be involved in more than one department, to assist them
in their executive work, subject to the approval of the Chief Minister and (13)
below;
(6) the Chief Minister may recommend to the
States that a minister should be dismissed;.
(7) the States may resolve that it has no
confidence in the Chief Minister or any other minister, but any such
proposition must have the declared support of a specified number of States
members;
(8) Codes of Conduct will be developed for the ministers and the Chief Ministerthe
Chief Minister will be responsible for developing and enforcing an appropriate
code of conduct for ministers, which will be supplementary to the Code of
Conduct for all States Members;.
(9) the States will establish a Procedure
Committee comprised of Members not involved in the executive to
be responsible to the States Assembly for all aspects of Assembly procedure,
including in particular scrutiny arrangements and an appropriate code of
conduct for all States members;
(10) upon the
basis of conditions
and terms of reference to be drawn up by the of the Procedure Committee, the
States will establish a small number of scrutiny committees comprised of
members not involved in the executive, the function of which will be to examine
the performance of government, scrutinise legislation, and to contribute towards
the development of policy;
(11) upon the recommendation of the Procedure
Committee, there will be a Public Accounts Committee comprised of the chairmen
of the scrutiny committees, plus at least one other States member not involved
in the executive. This will be charged with scrutinising
public expenditure and supported by a new post of Auditor-General, accountable
directly to the States Assembly;
(12) all committees of the States Assembly - e.g.
Procedure, Scrutiny, Public Accounts - as well as all individual States
members, will be appropriately resourced and supported;
(13) the number of States members who are not involved in the executive will be greater
than those who are;
(14) the Council of Ministers will be supported by
a Chief Executive who will be the is head
of the civil service, which. The civil service will be
unified at senior level; and . Hheads of
departments will form
will sit on aa corporate
management board under the leadership of the Chief Executive.
(15) the States will establish an independent
Appointments Commission, comprising persons who are not members of the Statesmade
up of non-States Members, with responsibility for ensuring that senior civil
service appointments are properly made, and which as
its first task will recommend to the States a person for appointment as Chief
Executive;
(16) the
Council of Ministers will establish set up and lead a
Liaison Group between the executive and the parishes to consider service delivery
and resource allocation issues as between the Executive and the parishes,
and to keep under review the relationship in the proposed new
governmental arrangements between the centre and the parishes.
APPENDIX 1
THE CLOTHIER REPORT - CHAPTER 11
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
|
Paragraph |
||||||
|
Chapter 2 : The electorate |
||||||
|
1. |
A Chief
Electoral Officer should be appointed |
|
2.4 |
|||
|
2. |
There
should be a Central Register of Voters |
|
2.4 |
|||
|
3. |
Election
expenses should be determined by the States |
|
2.4 |
|||
|
4. |
Polling
Stations to remain open from early morning till late evening |
|
2.5 |
|||
|
5. |
One
General election only for all members of the States and for the 12 Parish
Constables |
|
2.7 |
|||
|
6. |
Every
candidate to produce a policy statement |
|
2.8 |
|||
|
Chapter 3 : The States Assembly today |
||||||
|
7. |
The role
of Senator should be abolished |
|
3.7.3 |
|||
|
8. |
Connétables
should cease to be ex officio
members of the States |
|
3.8.6 |
|||
|
9. |
Comité des
Connétables to be consulted whenever their Parish is particularly affected |
|
3.8.7 |
|||
|
10. |
An
Electoral Commission to re-assign the vacant seats amongst the Parishes |
|
3.9.1 |
|||
|
11. |
All
members of the States to enjoy the same title, “Member of the States of
Jersey” (MSJ) |
|
3.9.2 |
|||
|
12. |
There
should be an assembly of between 42 and 44 members |
|
3.9.3 |
|||
|
Chapter 4 : The Committee structure |
||||||
|
13. |
There must
be a majority of members of the States not in executive office to provide
scrutiny of those who are, by means of three or four scrutiny committees |
|
4.14 &
4.15 |
|||
|
Chapter 5 : An improved structure |
||||||
|
14. |
Seven
departments should be substituted for the 24 Committees |
|
5.1 |
|||
|
15. |
Each
Department to have one minister and two members |
|
5.2 |
|||
|
16. |
Ministers
from each Department to form the Council of Ministers |
|
5.2 &
5.4 |
|||
|
17. |
There
should be a Chairman of the Council who would be the Chief Minister of the
Island |
|
5.2 |
|||
|
18. |
The
Council of Ministers should have power to give directions to the Departments |
|
5.2 |
|||
|
19. |
Chief
Minister to have the power to dismiss ministers |
|
5.2 |
|||
|
20. |
The States
to have the right to approve the appointment of ministers and substitute
ministers nominated by the Chief Minister |
|
5.2 |
|||
|
21. |
External
Relations to be in the province of the Chief Minister |
|
5.2 |
|||
|
22. |
The title
“President” to be abandoned and replaced by “Minister” |
|
5.3 |
|||
|
2 |
The
Council of Ministers to be subject to careful scrutiny by the balance of
members of the States |
|
5.4 |
|||
|
24. |
Proper
facilities for communications and research should be provided for members |
|
5.8 |
|
||
|
25. |
The
proceedings of the States to be taken down and printed |
|
5.9 |
|
||
|
26. |
There
should be a Treasury Department responsible for producing
the annual budget and for personnel |
|
5.10 &
5.11 |
|
||
|
27. |
A small number
of scrutiny committees to be formed from among non-executive members of the
States and elected by the States as a whole |
|
5.13 |
|
||
|
28. |
The
Chairmen of the scrutiny committees with one other member of the States to
form a Public Accounts Committee to examine and control expenditure |
|
5.13 |
|
||
|
29. |
There
should be created the post of “Auditor General” to assist the Public Accounts
Committee |
|
5.13 |
|
||
|
30. |
The first
task of a new States of Jersey must be to elect its Speaker and then a Chief
Minister |
|
5.16 |
|
||
|
31. |
Provision
should be made for written answers to members’ questions and for adjournment
debates |
|
5.17 |
|
||
|
Chapter 6 : The business of administration |
|
|||||
|
32. |
The Chief
Minister and Council of Ministers should have a Chief Secretary who would be
Head of the Civil Service |
|
6.4 |
|
||
|
33. |
There
should be an Appointments Commission for senior appointments in the Civil
Service |
|
6.5 |
|
||
|
34. |
There must
be an appellate mechanism for the challenge of quasi-judicial administrative
decisions and a mechanism for dealing with planning problems of an
exceptional kind |
|
6.7 |
|
||
|
Chapter 7 : The Parishes |
|
|||||
|
35. |
There
should be a more formal structure for the Parish Assembly |
|
7.5 |
|
||
|
36. |
Special
attention should be given to the Parish of St. Helier |
|
7.6 |
|
||
|
Chapter 8 : The Bailiff |
|
|||||
|
37. |
The
Bailiff should cease to act as president of the States or to take any
political part in the Island’s government and the States should elect their
own Speaker |
|
8.13 |
|
||
|
38. |
The Chief
Minister should be the direct link to the Home Office in London |
|
8.14 |
|
||
|
39. |
The office
of Bailiff should continue to be the highest in the Island on all occasions
when the order of precedence is observed |
|
8.15 |
|
||
|
Chapter 9 : An Ombudsman for Jersey? |
|
|||||
|
40. |
An
Ombudsman should be appointed to hear and determine complaints of
maladministration by Departments |
|
9.4 |
|
||
|
Chapter 10 : Towards a more open democracy |
|
|||||
|
41. |
There
should be regular use of consultative or discussion papers |
|
10.4 |
|
||
|
42. |
The
proceedings of scrutiny committees should normally be in public |
|
10.7 |
|
||
|
43. |
There
should be regular opportunities for members to question the Chief Minister |
|
10.8 |
|
||
|
44. |
The States
should ensure that the fullest facilities are given to the writing and
broadcasting media. |
|
10.9 |
|
||
APPENDIX 2
WEIGHTINGS AGREED BY THE STEERING GROUP - CRITERIA TO BE
USED TO TEST GOVERNMENT OPTIONS
|
Weighting |
|
Original weightings |
|
|
|
|
|
33.67 |
DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Enhanced democratic process/a more responsive
and representative electorate system |
28.75 |
|
|
Improved accountability |
15.63 |
|
|
Transparency/standards in public life -
keeping the public informed |
14.88 |
|
|
Electorate able to influence policy |
10.38 |
|
|
States members elected (directly) to the
States, all at the same time |
9.50 |
|
|
Clear rules of engagement for all activities |
8.00 |
|
|
Common remuneration for all activities |
5.25 |
|
|
Less bureaucracy |
7.63 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Weighting |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
14.39 |
COHERENT GOVERNMENT |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Co-ordinated/joined-up government |
36.25 |
|
|
States members more involved in Policy, not
day-to-day management |
30.63 |
|
|
Prioritised |
17.44 |
|
|
Adherence |
15.69 |
|
Weighting |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
25.37 |
DECISIVE GOVERNMENT |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Good decision-making |
45.63 |
|
|
Clear |
|
|
|
Consistent |
|
|
|
Co-ordinated |
|
|
|
Effective |
|
|
|
Reasoned |
|
|
|
Timely |
|
|
|
Effective leadership |
26.25 |
|
|
Subsidiarity |
17.00 |
|
|
Delegation with responsibility and clear
parameters - redress |
11.75 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Weighting |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
18.50 |
EFFECTIVE
SCRUTINY |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
An executive body (if created) should be a
significant minority of States members |
22.88 |
|
|
Adequately resourced (financial, manpower,
information, independent advice) |
22.13 |
|
|
Effective - with teeth |
16.43 |
|
|
Formalised (rules of engagement) public
consultation, inc. Green Paper - whole process |
15.57 |
|
|
Independent |
11.71 |
|
|
Accountable |
11.86 |
|
|
Role of the individual as well as the Assembly |
7.29 |
|
Weighting |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
8.07 |
PUBLIC ACCEPTABILITY |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100.00 |
The extent to which a system of government
fulfills public expectations and has high public appeal |
100.00 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note: |
The five main headings have been given
relative weightings which have a combined total of 100 points (i.e.
Democratic Government; Coherent Government; Decisive Government; Effective
Government; Effective Scrutiny; and Public Acceptability). |
|
|
|
In a similar manner, the criteria listed under
each of the five main headings have been assigned relative weightings, and
they also have combined totals of 100 points within each main heading. |
|