STATES OF JERSEY

CHIEF MINISTER: VOTE OF CENSURE
Lodged au Greffe on 16th June 2008
by Deputy G.P. Southern of St. Helier
STATES GREFFE
PROPOSITION
THE STATES
are asked to decide whether they are of opinion -
to
censure the Chief Minister for not providing full and accurate information to
the Assembly in relation to the financial and economic considerations during
the debate on the Esplanade Quarter Masterplan and, in the absence of such
information, for misleading the Assembly about the financial analysis of the
proposed developer.
DEPUTY G.P. SOUTHERN OF ST. HELIER
REPORT
I believe that States members have been seriously
misled in the debate on P60/2008, the Esplanade development. Material that I
consider to be essential to the debate and fundamental to a proper
understanding of the serious issues involved was withheld from members, and
almost certainly this information would have influenced the way members voted.
Whatever the outcome, there can be no doubt that the
way in which the decision of the esplanade development was arrived at was
unsatisfactory in many ways. This decision, described by many as the most
important decision on the future of St. Helier and of Jersey to take place
in a hundred years, took place in the absence of many of the important
financial and economic facts essential to a proper understanding of the case.
It was marked by repeated calls for further information which were refused by
the Chief Minister. Instead we got repeated sets of assurances that all was and
would be fine, reminiscent of the worst debates which took place under the old
committee system.
Members will recognise that the debate took part in 2
separate parts, the first of which largely concerned the design of the
waterfront project, led by the Minister for Planning and Environment, and the
second concentrated on the financial and economic issues underpinning the
development, led by the Chief Minister. My concerns relate to this second part
of the debate.
The essential material that was missing from the debate
consists of 2 reports, as follows –
The responsibilities and role of the States members
nominated as directors of the Waterfront Enterprise Board, namely Senators
Perchard and Routier and Deputy Huet, has been dealt with elsewhere. This
proposition deals only with the role of the Chief Minister in heading up the
debate.
My concerns are essentially twofold –
The case to answer centres on 3 issues –
In order to clarify the position, I asked the
following 3 questions as a matter of urgency on 10th June 2008 –
Were the CM and WEB representatives
aware of the results contained in section 2.2 of the PwC report and, if so,
when did they become aware and if not why not?
Why did they choose not to reveal
this important information to members in advance of the debate?
Having failed to release this data
earlier, why, when pressure was applied over information relating to the
financial deal, was it not revealed during the debate so that members could
properly consider it?
The full answers, given by the Deputy Chief Minister
to these questions will soon be published in Hansard. Selected answers are
given here.
The PwC
Report
Members learned on 10th June that the Chief Minister
was unaware of the contents of the PwC report before the debate –
“This (the PwC report) was a
confidential report and I do not believe that the Chief Minister would have
been made aware of the content …… I do not believe he was aware of the content
of the report until after the conclusion of the debate last week”
Following the release of this report after the debate had concluded, members
were able to read the crucial assessment in Section 2.2 of the ratio of
company turnover (A) to peak annual construction cost (B) as a means to test
whether a particular development is likely to overstretch a partner. A ratio
(A/B) of 5:1 is suggested as suitable. The table below this statement shows a
figure of only 1.41:1, and the final test comment is Fail.
This is the test used in this sector to decide whether
a particular development is likely to overstretch a partner. Not only does
Harcourt fail this test, it fails by a substantial margin. Instead of peak
construction costs being 20% of turnover, it is 70%.
The document then goes on to discuss, in the
4 paragraphs on page 8, what appear to be the circumstances or
mitigating factors for such a wide margin of failure on this test.
I highlight some of these comments here. They do not
particularly add any comfort.
Para. 1 – As a result we would recommend a wider consideration
of Harcourt’s financial capacity.
Para. 2 – The proposed scheme therefore appears to represent a
substantial commitment in comparison to the Company’s 2006 year end values.
Para. 3 – Harcourt management suggest that the true market
value of their total property portfolio is in the region of €1.1 billion,
although we have not been provided with any data to substantiate this. At the
same time recent turbulence in global financial markets may impact on trading
conditions in property markets and associated values.
Para. 4 – is entirely cautionary. It reads as follows –

I believe that anyone examining this report, either in
its entirety or section 2 alone, would surely insist that this data was
put before members as a matter of course to ensure a complete and informed
debate. Anything less, in and of itself, would constitute a dereliction of
duty.
The Chief Minister, as the proposer of this part of
the Masterplan scheme, should surely have made himself aware of some of the
detailed assessment of the financial position of Harcourt before coming to the
Assembly. Failing this, he should not have allowed himself to make statements
such as the ones he did, for example –
“The ruler has been run over
Harcourt thoroughly and they have come up A1 every time”
A score on a vital test of financial capacity of 1.4
out of a minimum 5 is far from “A1 every
time”, it is in the words of PwC a “fail”. The Chief Minister’s statement
was misleading.
The considerable reservations expressed above and
elsewhere in the report also contradict the further statement made by the Chief
Minister –
“PwC confirmed that Harcourt are
low-geared, very well placed, particularly since the sub-prime crisis –
very well placed because of the capital available to them and their low
gearing – to undertake this development.”
This statement is simply incorrect.
In Appendix D, the
Evaluation Proforma, which was included in the report accompanying P.60/2008,
gearing is not described as “low”. In the section entitled ‘Review of the
Financial Position’, whilst it is accepted that gearing levels are in line with
the range generally observed for property development companies, the gearing
levels are described as “substantial” and “significant”.
Also, in the Review of
Solvency, PwC point out the predominantly short-term nature of the Group’s
debt, with only €59 million (14.6%) out of €405 million being
repayable in more than one year. Furthermore, in the Review of financial
performance, PwC note also the increasing debt position of the company and the
way in which gross profits are swallowed up by debt repayments.
At one stage in the debate, the Chief Minister
appeared to offer greater information on the financial arrangements, in camera, if needed, but when asked as
the debate ended to do so by me, he refused.
In addition to the thrust of the reference back
proposed by Deputy Baudains, which was based on the need for the provision of
further financial information, and my own proposal to have the financial and
economic aspects referred to Scrutiny, many members expressed their
reservations about proceeding with this important decision. Deputy Mezbourian
had the following interpretation –
“it is naïve of them, to bring a
proposition of this substance without producing some of the due diligence and
without being prepared to answer questions.”
Deputy Gorst, not one to criticise the actions of
Ministers as a matter of routine, and one with a reputation for some financial
acumen, was also sceptical –
“Due diligence by Dunn &
Bradshaw and by PwC … gives me no great comfort”
The Chief Minister came under considerable pressure
during the debate to take the opportunity to offer more financial information
in order to ensure well-informed and well-founded decision. He singularly
failed to do so.
The Economic
Advisor’s Impact Assessment
Turning to the second of the missing reports which
might have enabled members to form a more fully rounded view of the decision,
the Economic Advisor’s economic impact assessment, this was commissioned by the
Council of Ministers and the Chief Minister therefore had complete discretion
to release it. He chose not to do so, despite a request from me. He stated that
the report was confidential, and I have since asked for reasons why this should
be so.
Its confidentiality is open to question in that an
economic impact assessment is by its very nature a high-level document
concerned with the Island’s economy and the net economic effects of the
project. It is certainly unlikely to be commercially sensitive. A very similar
assessment, the Socio-economic impact of the previous Waterfront scheme,
undertaken by PwC for WEB and dated February 2006 was made available to members
within a month of its presentation to WEB.
In it are to be found figures and estimates for
leakage, displacement and multiplier factors on the sectors of the Island
economy both during the build and longer term impacts of the development of
office, retail, housing and hotel space proposed at that time.
In it we find statements referring to the build
as –
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and consequent on completion –

We were informed that today 80% of the new Masterplan
envisages 80% displacement. Why the change? Would members like to see the
arguments around this issue before ploughing on with this decision? I believe
many would. However this was not possible in the absence of the new report. Instead
we had to content ourselves with the Chief Minister’s assurance that –
“The Economic Adviser’s Report was
overwhelmingly positive.”
The question must remain in many minds, and certainly
does in mine – Ah yes, but is it comprehensive, accurate and realistic;
and do the longer term secondary impacts also stack up?
We simply did not know because the Chief Minister
refused access to the report.
Further on, in the previous report we find the
following statements on the impact of the old scheme?

Again one has to ask where the new estimates are. Are
they significantly different? Do we wish to commit ourselves to a creating a
further 4,500 jobs, many of which require migrant labour along with their
families, at a time when the population has just risen by 1,400 to top 90,000?
More importantly, where were these figures in the debate? They were largely
absent because the Chief Minister decided that the relevant report would stay
firmly closed.
It was completely spurious to state that these figures
had been seen by Scrutiny so they had been accepted. That was and remains
simply not true. These sorts of Economic Impact figures had no relevance to the
terms of reference of the Scrutiny investigation. That merely covered the tiny
issue of the “heads of terms” of the agreement.
The Chief Minister himself stated clearly during the
debate that it would be –
“wrong to take a decision on
anything other than full information”.
Yet that precise outcome is exactly what the Chief
Minister engineered – a decision made with less than the full information.
It was indeed wrong. He deserves the censure of the Assembly for doing so.
There are no financial or manpower implications
arising from this proposition.